Animals often produce honest signals, which is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective. A recent paper provides a new method for constructing mathematical models sufficiently complex to investigate and test theories about the evolution of honest signals. Moreover, this model confirms the authors' argument that the Handicap Principle – the textbook explanation for honest signalling – can be fully rejected.
Animals produce an amazing diversity of signals, which include the colourful plumage of peacocks, the roars of rutting stags, loud begging calls of chicks, stotting of gazelles, and scent marks and pheromones of male mice. These signals are often honest or reliable, which is surprising, because deception can be beneficial. If deception spreads and becomes common, then the signals will be ignored and communication breaks down. So, how does natural selection maintain honesty; what prevents the spread of dishonest signals?
Zahavi argued that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. It is the costs or wastefulness of a signal that makes it impossible to produce a fake signal. He called this idea the "Handicap Principle", and his proposal became widely accepted after Grafen published his 'strategic handicap' model, which he claimed confirmed the Handicap Principle.
Dustin Penn (Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, Vetmeduni Vienna) and Szabolcs Számadó (Budapest University of Technology and Economics) have been collaborating on this theoretical problem for several years. They have previously shown why Grafen's and other previous models have been misinterpreted. They recently teamed up with two other theoreticians to construct a new model to analyze the surprising complexities of signalling games. In addition to providing a new method for constructing more complex and general models, their analyses show why the signal costs are irrelevant to explaining honesty.
Mathematical signalling games were originally adopted from economics, and they have often been used to model the evolution of animal signals and plant-pollinator interactions. These signalling games were far too simple, however, because they only considered the evolution of the sender, who produces the signal; they ignored the receiver, who can evolve decisions for how to respond to the signal. Thus, models are needed to investigate more complex signalling games and include this double-optimization problem.
The new model by Szamado and colleagues provides a novel and general approach for calculating cost functions and for determining how a signal will evolve and reach a stable evolutionary equilibrium. The authors then used their model to re-examine overly simplified signalling games, previously used for studying honesty in sexual signals and offspring begging calls. These are asymmetric signalling models, as the sender has more information about their condition than the receiver (similar to purchasing a used car of unknown quality; which is known as the 'lemon problem' in economics). The results show that an infinite number of signals can evolve that are honest, including signals that have no costs and only benefits. This new model shows that signals do not need to be costly in order to be honest, contrary to the Handicap Principle. This result confirms Penn and Szamado's argument that Grafen's model has been misinterpreted; it is not a model of the Handicap Principle. Honest signals evolve in this model, not because of the costs of the signal, but because of a particular tradeoff, a constraint that makes deceptive signals costly and honesty beneficial.
Thus, this new theoretical model confirms that the Handicap Principle can be fully rejected. Moreover, it provides a new method for testing ideas about the evolution of honest signals. The authors point out that this has become a rather timely topic, given the increasing spread of misinformation, which has become "one of the most important problem facing our species".
The article "Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs" by Szabolcs Számadó, István Zachar, Dániel Czégel, and Dustin J. Penn was published in BMC Biology.
Scientific article
Also see the commentary in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS): "The peacock’s tail and other flashy ornaments don’t have to come at a cost"
2023-01-30